Sponsors of defined contribution plans often hire financial advisors to help them to design and monitor these plans. I compare the designs of plans that advisors help create and monitor (client plans) to the designs of plans that the advisors use themselves (advisor plans). I find that advisors have an impact on the investment menus of their clients. Compared to an average pair of plans, a pair of plans that have the same advisor is more likely to hold identical funds and use identical fund families. Client plans also tend to have similar holdings to their advisors' plans. They tend to hold identical funds, identical fund families and identical categories of mutual funds. When examining the funds that clients do not share with their advisors, I find that these funds have higher expense ratios than the funds that are held by both clients and advisors. I find only tentative evidence that clients who compensate their advisors only indirectly through commissions have more expensive funds than clients that also provide direct compensation to their advisors.
Introduction
Sponsors of defined contribution plans often hire financial advisors to help them design and monitor their plans. These advisors specialize in pension and employee benefits consulting and frequently take on fiduciary liability along with the plan sponsor. One of the responsibilities of the advisor is to select and monitor the investment choices offered by the plan. Existing literature finds that the investment choices offered by the plan can have dramatic effects on saving outcomes (e.g. Brown, Liang and Weisbenner 2007; Benartzi and Thaler 2001; Choi, Laibson, and Madrian 2004) . Given the importance of investment choices for savings outcomes, this paper examines the role of that plan advisors play in determining these investment choices.
My strategy is to compare the design of plans that advisors help create (client plans) to those that plan advisors use themselves (advisor plans). The null hypothesis is that controlling for the characteristics of the sponsor and advisor (e.g. size of the plan) the client plans resemble those of their advisors -if an investment option is good for the advisor it should also be good for the client. The alternative hypothesis is that client plans differ from those of their advisors in a systematic way. The relationship between the plan sponsor and its advisor is that of a principal and an agent. Sponsors want a plan that allows its employees earn investment return and diversify risk. Advisors' goal is to maximize fees. They may steer plan sponsors towards investments that generate indirect compensation for the advisor but may not be in the best interest of the plan sponsor or plan participants, GAO (2009) 
The principal-agent literature has a tradition of uncovering conflicts of interest by comparing services that agents perform on themselves to services they perform on their clients. For example, Levitt and Syverson (2008) show that real estate agents sell their own houses for more than they sell houses of their clients. Domenighetti et al. (1993) find higher surgery rates among the general population than among physicians. My paper does the same for retirement plan advisors. Another approach to empirically identify conflicts of interest is to examine the difference between outcomes that involve agents and outcomes without agents. An example of this type of work is Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009) who find that broker-sold funds perform worse than directly-sold funds. A similar approach is taken by Lefgren, McIntyre, and Miller (2010) who show that bankruptcy filings are driven by a lawyer's interest rather than by a client's circumstances.
It is possible that the agency problem between the sponsor and the plan advisor is responsible for the poor designs of many 401k plans. For example, Brown, Liang and Weisbenner (2007) find that two thirds of investment options added to 401k plans between 1998 and 2002 were high-cost actively managed fund resulting in an increase the expense ratio paid by participants. In a different study, Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2006) find that only half of existing 401k plans provide an adequate menu of investment options. In the follow-up work, Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2007) find that the turnover in investment options is largely undesirable: plans tend to delete funds that subsequently do no worse than the funds with which they were substituted. In contrast, Tang et al. (2010) find that most plans offer an efficient menu of investment options.
A number of papers correlate the actions of financial intermediaries with their compensation structure. Christoffersen, Evans and Musto (2010) show that brokers sell fund that give them higher compensation. Simiarly, Edelen et al. (2010) find that funds that compensate brokers though opaque payments receive greater fund inflows. Mullainathan, Nöth and Schoar (2010) use an audit study of personal financial advisors. They find that advisors push for actively managed funds and encourage return chasing -advice likely driven by conflicts of interests.
Most recently, Pool, Sialm and Stefanescu (2012) find that funds affiliated with the trustee of the 401k plan were much less likely to be deleted from the investment menus than non-affiliated funds. 1 This paper also complements burgeoning theoretical literature on financial intermediation. Stoughton et al. (2011) examine the reasons for the existence of financial intermediaries and the use of kickbacks as compensation. In a different theoretical model Inderst and Ottaviani (2011) view kickbacks as incentives to learn about appropriate investments for sophisticated clients and as tools of exploitation of unsophisticated clients. Carlin and Manso (2011) examine dynamic model of investor learning and financial product obfuscation. Carlin and Gervais (2009) explore the legal rules that maximize welfare in retail financial markets.
Data

Advisors
I use data from form 5500 that all private pension plans must file with the Department of Labor.
The form includes basic information about the plan including the name and address of the plan sponsor, funding arrangements and the number of participants. There are a number of schedules attached to the form that contain more detailed financial information. Plans with over 100 participants are required to file Schedule C which contains detailed information about service providers to the plan. Until 2009 the schedule included information only on providers that received direct compensation from the plan. However, beginning with filings for 2009 the schedule has been expanded to include providers who received indirect compensation. It thus enables me to identify providers that received any compensation. Schedule C distinguishes among 50 different types of services provided to a plan. These range from recordkeeping to audit services. I focus on general consulting, pension consulting, and plan investment advisory services (service codes 16, 17 and 27 respectively). Note that I do not include firms that provide participant advisory services (service code 16) or firms that provide investment management services (service codes 51 and 52). This is because I am looking for firms that help with the overall design of the plan rather than firms that help individual participants, or firms that manage a specific fund or a separately managed account for the plan.
Even then my screen is not perfect. For example, I find that firms such as Daily Access or ADP are providers of general consulting services. However, these firms are mostly in the business of recordkeeping and payroll processing rather than advisory. I look up the website of every advisor and check that their primary business is advisory. For example PricewaterhouseCoopers is a consultant to a number of plans but I exclude it because its consulting is more likely to do with accounting and risk assurance rather than plan design. A number of firms provide more than one type of service. For example, Fulton Financial Corporation is often listed as providing both recordkeeping services as well as advisory services.
There were about 2000 different advisors (identified with service codes 16, 17 and 27) to private pension plans reported in 2009. The market for these advisors is fairly concentrated as the top 50 advisors served nearly half of the plans. Many advisors appear to be small firms. Only 280 were large enough to file their own "long" form 5500. This means that these firms had a retirement plan for their own employees with more than 100 participants. The remaining firms either did not have a retirement plan for their own employees (unlikely if they are in the retirement consulting business) or their plan had fewer than 100 participants. Of the 280 that filed their own "long" form 5500, about two thirds served only one client. I limit my sample to advisors to which I can match at least three client plans. Furthermore, I require that both client and advisor plans consist mostly of mutual funds. I end up with a sample of 14 advisors.
Clients
As with advisors, I focus on clients whose plans consist mostly of mutual funds. It is common that large 401(k) plans offer separately managed accounts as investment options instead of mutual funds. The plans who contract with an investment manager to manage these accounts may be able to negotiate lower costs than with a mutual fund (see Kopcke et al, 2010) . The problem is that it is impossible to learn how actively managed these accounts are or what the expenses are. Schedule H on Form 5500 differentiates between the value of assets in separately managed accounts and value of assets in registered investment companies (mostly mutual funds).
Thus, I screen out any plans that have at more than 20% of assets (ignoring company stock) in separately managed accounts.
I also limit my sample to plans who reported having an advisor (service codes16, 17 and 27) on their Schedule C. 3 2 For example, a huge pension and benefits consultant Hewitt has a plan that consists of mostly separately managed accounts.
In addition, this advisor has to have a plan on its own, i.e. it has to be one of 
Plan characteristics
Information on the number of participants and the total value of plan assets is easily extracted from DOL's plain text file where each plan is identified by the sponsor EIN and plan number. This measure ranges from 0 (no change in the menu) to 1 (a completely different menu).
The final two characteristics of a plan are dummy variables indicating the nature of advisor's compensation. Schedule C asks a yes-or-no question of whether a provider received indirect compensation in connection with the provider's service to the plan. This may include commissions and revenue sharing received from mutual funds. Schedule C also asks about the amount of direct compensation. It is possible -in fact, it is quite frequent -that a provider would receive both direct and indirect compensation. Therefore, I created two dummy variables: one indicating whether an advisor was compensated through indirect compensation only; and one indicating whether an advisor was compensated through direct compensation only. about the same number of participants but more than twice the assets. This is to be expected as the professionals employed by advisors probably have higher incomes than the average worker at their client firms. We see that on average client plans have about 18 mutual funds in their plans with advisors slightly higher at 19 mutual funds per plan. Both of these are somewhat higher than the average number of investment options reported of 12 reported by Deloitte (2010) . The number of mutual fund categories is also slightly higher for advisor plans than client plans. The 
Descriptive Statistics
Analysis
Is an average advisor plan systematically different from an average client plan?
I first examine whether the differences in average characteristics of client and advisor plans are statistically significant and whether they persist after controlling for other plan characteristics. In Panel A of Table 3 I regress various plan characteristics including the number of funds, styleadjusted expense ratios, turnover, and the change in the investment menu on a dummy indicating that a plan is an advisor plan rather than a client plan. The first column shows that advisor plans are not significantly different in terms of the number of mutual fund options they offer. The second and third columns show that advisor plans have less expensive funds than their clients -both in terms of the style-adjusted audited net expense ratio and in terms of the style-adjusted prospectus expense ratio. The effect is about ten basis points, and is statistically significant at the five percent level. The difference between style-adjusted turnover in advisor and client plans is statistically insignificant. Similarly, there is no difference between the average stewardship grade of client and advisor plans. Finally, while advisors change their menus less than clients, the difference is not statistically significant.
In Panel B of Table 3 I control for the size of the plan. The statistical significance on the advisor dummy goes away for the audited expense ratio, and becomes statistically significant only at the ten percent level for the prospectus ratio. Thus, controlling for size there is only suggestive evidence that client plans have on average more expensive funds. As expected, size of the plan in terms of assets reduces the average expense ratio as bigger size gives plan access to less expensive funds. Overall, the average characteristics of client and advisor plan are similar. In the next two sections, I examine whether this similarity is driven by the similarity in holdings.
Do client plans that have the same advisor have similar funds?
To measure similarity in holding between two plans I use three progressively broader measures of commonality in the investment menu. The first is the percentage of funds that are common to both plans. It is calculated as the number of funds that appear in both plans divided by the average number of funds in the two plans. The third measure is defined analogously except the defining characteristic of a fund is its Morningstar category.
With 136 different plans I have 9,180 different pairs of plans. Table 4 shows the average value of these three commonality measures for all pairs of plans and for different subsets. Among all plans the average percentage of common fund holdings is about eight percent. Naturally, the percentage of common family holding is much higher at 40 percent, and still higher when looking at the percentage of funds that belong to the same mutual fund categories. The second and third rows show similarities among client plans, and among advisor plans. I see that advisor plans are no more similar to each other than client plans are to each other. The commonality of holdings between the 122 pairs of advisors and their own clients is 15 percent -almost double the commonality among all plans. As a check, I calculate the commonality measure between every client and every advisor (rather than just its own advisor). The magnitude of this measure is the same as between any other pair of plans. Thus, it is the specific relationship between client and its own advisor that predicts commonality of holdings. The last row in Table 4 shows that there is also a great deal of commonality among plans that share the same advisor -about 14 percent.
To find out if commonality of holding among plans of the same advisor is driven by some other factors, I estimate a set of regressions where the dependent variable is commonality of holdings, and the independent variables are dummies for whether a pair of plans has the same advisor, are located in the same state, and whether the plan sponsors are in the same industry. I also calculate the absolute percent difference in size -both in terms of assets and the number of participants.
Since I am interested in the impact of having the same advisor on client plans, I use only pairs of client plans in these regressions. With 122 client plans I have 7381 different pairs.
The results are shown in Table 5 . The first specification shows that the effect of having the same advisor on commonality of holdings is highly statistically significant. In the second specification I control for whether plans are in the same state and the same industry, and for differences in size of plans. The results show that being in the same state increases commonality by seven percentage points. Being in the same industry has no effect. The coefficient on the difference in the size in terms of assets is statistically significant showing that plans that are different in size are also different in what funds they hold. For each percentage point difference in size the commonality measure decreases by one hundredth of a percentage point. Overall, even controlling for a variety of factors, it is clear that having the same advisor predicts commonality of holdings.
Do clients and their own advisors have similar holdings?
To examine the degree of similarity between clients and their own advisors I re-estimate the regressions in Table 5 using pairs of clients and advisors. This includes pairs of every client with every advisor. The independent variable of interest is the "own advisor" dummy that identifies pairs of clients and their own advisors. The results are in Table 6 . They show that commonality of holdings between clients and their own advisors is much higher than between clients and someone else's advisors. This is true across all measures of commonality: individual funds, fund families, and fund categories.
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Another piece of evidence that advisors have an impact on their clients is from the 11 clients that switched advisors between 2009 and 2010. Of those 11 changed its menu completely, another replaced 75 percent of its funds. On average, funds that had a new advisor changed their menu by 44 percent compared to 10 percent for plans that did not change their advisor. 5 The impact of an advisor is also apparent in studying the deletions and additions to plan menus. When the same fund is deleted from multiple plans it tends to be from plans that share an advisor. This is to be expected since plans that share an advisor are more likely to have had that fund in their menu in the first place. Similarly, when a fund is added to more than one plan, it tends to be to plans of the same advisor. A more systematic analysis of additions and deletions is left for future research.
What funds do clients hold that advisors don't and vice versa?
In previous section I found that clients and advisors on average share only 15 percent of investment options. In this section I examine the portion of plan holdings that advisors and clients do not share. Specifically, for each client and advisor pair I calculate the characteristics of three groups of funds: funds held by the client but not by the advisor ('client only' funds); funds held by the advisor but not by the client ('advisor only' funds); and funds held by both clients and advisors ('shared' funds). Table 7 shows the characteristics of these three groups of funds. It shows that expense ratios of 'client only' funds are about ten basis points higher than the expense ratio of funds that advisor and clients share. The effect is statistically significant with the t-statistic of about 6.'Client only' funds are even more expensive when compared to advisor only plans. The effect is twelve basis points using prospectus expense ratio and 14 basis points using audited expense ratio.
Interestingly, the difference between funds that advisors share with their clients and funds that only advisors use are small and statistically insignificant. The differences for turnover across all three groups are insignificant. The fourth row shows that 'client only' funds have lower stewardship grades than funds shared with advisors. The effect is 0.3 of a grade point and is highly statistically significant. In summary, it appears that 'client only' funds are more expensive and poorly governed.
Does indirect compensation of advisors impact the characteristics of their clients' plans?
Why are 'client only' funds significantly more expensive and poorly governed? Moreover, why do advisors shun these funds but allow them in their client plans? One hypothesis is that advisors benefit from having their clients hold expensive funds. Advisors may receive indirect compensation in the form of commissions and revenue sharing -the more expensive the funds in their client plans, the more commissions and revenue sharing. Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2009) find that high cost funds tend to perform worse than even before fees. Therefore, funding advisors using revenue sharing from high cost funds add additional costs. The data uses pairs of plans every client with every advisor. Own advisor is a dummy indicating that the pair of plans is that of a client and its own advisor. Same state and same industry are defined analogously. Difference in assets (participants) is the absolute value of the difference in assets (participants) divided by the average assets (participants) of the two plans. Commonality of funs is the percentage of funds common to each pair of plans. Commonality of fund families is the percentage of funds in each pair of plans that belong to the same fund family. Commonality of fund categories is the percentage of funds that belong to the same Morningstar category. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. A *, **, and *** denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. 
